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LANGUAGE.
BY PROF. ERNST MACH.
COMMUNICATION by language is not only a necessary con-
dition of the origin of science, it is also the source from which
the element of comparison in science has sprung. I may be per-
mitted, therefore, without making the slightest pretension to au-
thority on questions in which I have not made original studies, to
state my views concerning the origin and development of language
and its significance for scientific thought.
We find ourselves in the possession of speech as soon as con-
sciousness appears ; to a child this is so much a matter of course
that it is frequently much astonished at hearing that babies are
obliged to learn to talk. As soon as the facts have wrung from us
this admission we naturally inquire: Who yfri^/ taught language?
Who invented it ? If we have outlived the ingenuous period which
looks upon language as a gift of the gods, the first explanations
that naturally present themselves are the rationalistic theories
which regard language as an ingenious invention, and which at-
tribute to men not yet in possession of language a far higher de-
gree of intelligence than they even now exhibit. We learn from
linguistic science that one and the same language exhibits different
stages of development, that different languages exist which are
related to one another and which are therefore presumably of com-
mon origin, and lastly that there are languages which show widely
varying degrees of complexity in their structure. The weightier
and more promising question with respect to the development of
language is thus forced into the foreground, that of the origin is
relegated to the rear, and the resolution of the latter found to be
identical with that of the former. In addition, we can readily ob-
serve the development of speech and thought in our own persons.
And from the fact of our all having so abundant material for obser-
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vation immediately at hand, both philosophical and psychological
science have fortunately been placed in a position to compete suc-
cessfully with positive research in this domain.
Traces of the ancient ingenuousness still linger in the question
which is now so frequently put as to the origin of huma 71 speech, as
if human speech ever had at any definite place or time a precisely
determinable beginning ! From the modern scientific point of view
a totally different conception of the problem must be entertained.
Whence, pray, should human language have been developed, if
not from the animal language of our ancestors! And no unbiassed
person can entertain the slightest doubt that animal language ac-
tually exists. Every species of animals, particularly such as have
social habits, has its accurately distinguishable cries of warning,
allurement, attack, etc. The origin of the purely reflex sounds ut-
tered and determined by the human organism accordingly require
no explanation whatever ; for sounds of this character were already
possessed by our animal ancestors.
The undeniable and stupendous differences between animal
language and human language are as follows. Animal language has
at its command only a small number of sounds, and these are em-
ployed to express situations and emotions (fear, joy, anger) which
while different are extremel}' general in character and are accom-
panied by corresponding activities which in their turn also are ex-
tremely indeterminate (flight, the search for food, attack). These
activities are then more precisely determined by the actual situa-
tion. Animal language, further, is largely innate and is learned
only in a minute degree by imitation. The very reverse is true of
human language. The belief that animal language is absolutely
invariable is not borne out by the facts; the belief is refuted alone
by the circumstance that related animal species employ systems of
sounds of which any one is easily recognisable as a variation of the
other.
The cries of the house dove, the wild dove, and the turtle
dove may be cited as examples. ^ But the power of producing the
phonic elements of language is also inborn in man, being part of the
heredity of his organs of speech ; and it is even permissible to as-
sume a difference of races in this particular.- The combinations of
1 To obtain an idea of the extent to which the cries of animals are inborn and the extent to
which they are a product of imitation, I once proposed to a celebrated physiologist the plan of
interchanging the eggs of house doves and turtle doves brooding some distance apart. But the
experiment could not be carried out from our inability to obtain birds which were brooding simul
taneously.
2 A colleague of mine, a Jew, assured me that he was able to recognise a Jew by the sound of
LANGUAGE. I 73
sounds only are learned. And the situation here is precisely what it
is in the case of movements, which are innate in animals in far more
enduring combinations than in man.^ Man is born "younger," so
to speak, and consequently with more capacity for adaptation.
It is customary to say that the language of animals is inartic-
ulate. I am curious to know what ground there may be for such a
contention. Many of the sounds uttered by animals and repeated
by them on similar occasions, and in the same order, admit quite
easily of being reproduced by our letters ; and in the case of the
other sounds for which this is impossible, owing to the fact that we
possess no characters for sounds that do not accord with our or-
gans, an acoustic or phonographic transcription might be resorted
to. If we examine the facts closely, we are constrained to admit
that we are situated with respect to the language of animals pre-
cisely as we are with respect to any human language that is unin-
telligible to us, and that the word inariicula/e merely means no
more than not-English, not-German, and not-French. We might
with equal reason call the movements of animals inarticulate be-
cause they do not correspond precisely to ours.
Animals are not credited with sufficient intellectual capacity
to form a language; that power is supposed to be wanting to all
creatures except to man. But is it found in man as the result of a
sudden miracle, or has it been produced in him by gradual develop-
ment? If the latter assumption is true, and it will be the one most
likely to be accepted to-day, then the germs of human intelligence
must have existed in some form in animals also. Let it be remem-
bered that the slightest possible dijference of degree will account for
everything. A man whose capacity for work produces but a trifle
more than is necessary to supply his wants is assured of a constant
improvement in his condition, whereas he is almost certain to be
ruined by the slightest difference in the opposite direction. Simi-
larly, a species of animals or race of men the range of whose intel-
lectual variations is so narrow that they can never rise above a cer-
tain level will be incapable of development, whereas a very slight
a single word, even without seeing him. I believe that I may assert the same with reference to
Slavs. And while entire words are certainly not innate, as Psammetichus (Herodotus ii, 2) be
lieved, certain characteristic phonic elements are nevertheless inborn in every race.
1 Young animals perform the movements characteristic of their species at a very early age
and after the manner of a piece of mechanism. The sparrow is observed to hop only, for the
reason that he moves mostly from branch to branch on trees where this sort of movement alone
is possible. The lark, on the other hand, is seen to run only. Might it not be possible to confine
several generations of sparrows to level ground, and in this manner to teach them to run ? Such
a transformation of habits would doubtless be effected more easily than an anatomic one, and yet
would have sufficient weight with respect to the Darwinian theory. The experiment is allied in
character to that mentioned above with the doves.
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average but constant excess of intelligence entailing effects not
entirely effaced in the following generations, is a certain guarantee
of continued evolution.
The underestimation of the intelligence of animals has been a
commonplace for centuries. On the other hand, we now not in-
frequently meet with instances of ingenuous overestimation of the
intelligence of animals which are quite as unfounded. I myself
raised a warning voice against this overestimation.^ Any great
development of the intelligence of animals is impossible for the
reason that it would be both unnecessary and useless in their simple
sphere of life. Long ago I observed the mechanical regularity
with which beetles always creep uptvards on a stalk, no matter
how often they are turned round, just as other insects fly mechan-
ically towards the light, etc. Since that time, the curious and
instructive experiments of Jacques Loeb on the heliotropism of
animals have appeared, which throw a flood of light upon the me-
chanics of the lower organisms. But Sir John Lubbock who annihi-
lated in so exact and praiseworthy a manner the illusions respect-
ing the intelligence of bees and ants, appears to me to assert alto-
gether too much intellectual power on the part of dogs.-'
I am accordingly of the opinion that the view which assumes
a qualitative difference between animal and human intelligence is
a relic of an old superstition ; I am able to see a quantitative differ-
ence, a difference of degree only, in the animal scale including man,
—a difference that assumes enormous proportions with the distance
of the single members apart. The lower we descend the weaker
the individual memory becomes and the shorter the series of asso-
ciations at the command of the animal. A similar difference exists
between children and grown people. In like manner, I see a quan-
titative difference only between the language of ?nan and the language
of animals. The same difference exists even between human lan-
guages of different degrees of development. Even in the most
^ Analysis of the Sensations (German ed. Jena, i8S6. Page 79. English Trans., Chicago, 189-
page, 82-83.)
2 Lubbock takes boxes bearing the inscriptions [\\ Bread, Meat, Milk, and succeeds in training
his dog to distinguish them—but unquestionably by the aid of some other characteristic than the
inscription. An instance of the common overestimation of the intellect of dogs is the following
A young dog learns to " beg " for sugar. One day it is observed that while alone in the room
with a canary-bird which has a piece of sugar attached to its cage the dog of its own accord be
gins to " beg " for it. This act is interpreted as an appeal to the canary-bird, whereas it is noth
ing but a simple association of the movement with the sight of the sugar. Think of the number
of analogies and of the long series of associations wliich would have to be at the disposal of the
dog if this interpretation were correct ! It would be in tlie position of tlie negro who begs from a
fetish what it is impossible to receive from a fetisli. Paradoxical as it may sound, a far higher
degree of intellect is required for so colossal a piece of stupidity than is at the disposal of a dog.
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highly developed human languages it happens that the full mean-
ing of some utterance is determined entirely by the situation ; while
it is well known that languages in a low stage of development very
frequently have to have recourse to gestures to be understood, so
that when spoken in the dark they are partly unintelligible.
As I take it, then, the right course to pursue is to suffer the
question as to the origin of language to rest for the time being and
in its place to propound the question of how animal language has
been developed into the greater wealth and greater precision of liu-
man language. In this manner, the discontinuity between speaking
and not-speaking, which forms the main difficulty of the problem,
will be removed, and it will be discovered that the discontinuity
never existed in the manner which has been assumed. Lazar Gei-
ger,^ to whom we owe the most luminous of the contributions to this
subject, does actually pursue his investigations along these lines,
although reversions to the old form of the inquiry are not wanting
in his works. And when these reversions do occur, the most sin-
gular and most inept solutions make their appearance. I agree
with Noire- that the manner in which Geiger conceives the origin
of the first language-cry is absolutely incomprehensible in the case
of a man of Geiger's ability. I am further of the opinion that
Noir6 has made the most important advances over Geiger. Great
merit is to be accorded to Noir^'s book even though one does not
share his Kantian-Schopenhauerian point of view and though one
cannot assume with him the abrupt difference between animal and
human intelligence. And although Noir^ also in consequence of
this latter circumstance sometimes reverts to the old form of the
inquiry, his results nevertheless remain valid for the question under
discussion.
It will be admitted by every one that sounds expelled uncon-
sciously from the human organism could never have acquired mean-
ing and significance diS phonic symbols save in the event that things
which are observable and have been observed by jnen in common are
designated by them. It will furthermore not be doubted that in the
beginning of civilisation the employment of a symbol, or even any-
thing like an appreciation of it, could not have been possible save
where extremely strong common interests required some common activity
which readily lent itself to the apprehension of all. The symbo
under such circumstances will associate itself with the activity, with
the sensory result oi the activity, and with the sensorily perceptible
1 Geiger, Sprache iind I'ernunft. Stuttgart. iS6S.
2 Noire, Ursprung der Sprache.—Das Werkzeus-—Logos.
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medium or instrument of the same. I think that this will be imme-
diately accepted by every one, no matter what his philosophical or
scientific position is. The results of my own speculations upon the
import of language, of concepts, and of theories, in my own special
department of physics, which I undertook without a knowledge of
either Geiger or Noire, point to the same results.^
The evolution of language, accordingly, is associated step for
step with the various forms of activities involved in labor in com-
mon. In the precise measure in which the pursuits and industries
of men are perfected is the sphere and power of language aug-
mented. It is not to be denied that in higher stages of develop-
ment events and objects of lesser importance form the occasion for
the invention of new terms, just as in family life we frequently ob-
serve some chance word uttered in jest acquiring the office of a per-
manent symbol. But for this to be accomplished the value and
import of speech must have already been known from use ; there
are requisite to it a certain freedom and disburdenment which are
certainly wanting in the beginning of civilisation.
-
The principal value of language is contained in the fact of its
being a medium for the communication of thoughts; and the very
circumstance that language compels us to describe the new in
terms of the known, or at least to analyse the new by comparison
with the known, is the source of a distinct gain, not only for the
person addressed but also for the person who speaks. A thought
is frequently rendered much more clear by our imagining ourselves
called upon to communicate it to others. Language has also a
great value for solitary thinking. The sensory elements enter into
the most manifold combinations and in these different combinations
possess the most varied interests. A word embraces everything
that is of importance for some single sphere of interest, and draws
forth all the images connected with this sphere, as if they were
beaded upon a string. It is remarkable that we can employ word-
symbols correctly without having full consciousness of all the
images which are symbolised by them, just as we can read correctly
without scrutinising each single letter closely. In like manner, we
never suspect the existence of a portrait in a portfolio bearing the
inscription "Landscapes," even though the contents of the port-
folio be not familiar to us.
The ever-recurring view that language is indispensable for
every species of thought I must regard as an exaggeration. This
1 Compare, for example, my Analysis of the Sensations, English translation, p. iGo et seq.
2 Compare Marty, Ursprung di-r Sprache. Wiirzburg, 1S75.
LANGUAGE. I77
did not escape the notice of Locke even, who declared that inas-
much as language scarcely ever accorded completely with the facts,
it might on occasions constitute even a drawback to thinking.
Visualistic thought, which is concerned exclusively with the
association and comparison of images, and with the recognition
of their agreement or their difference, can be carried on without
the intervention of language. For example, I observe an apple
on a tree too high for me to reach ; I remember that on a former
occasion by some good chance I came into possession of another
apple by means of a forked branch broken from a tree ; I notice a
branch of this kind on the ground near me, but see at once that it
is too short. This process may be gone through without ever so
much as a single word's occurring to me. I am accordingly unable
to believe that monkeys, for example, never employ sticks to ac-
complish certain ends, and never construct bridges by throwing
trunks of trees across brooks, for the mere reason that they are not
in possession of language and consequently of any concept oiforni,
or of any concept of sticks and trees, as of isolated movable things
which may be sundered from their environment. On the contrary,
it may be shown that the inability to make inventions rests upon
an entirely different foundation. In saying this, I am far from
denying that images also are invested with greater clearness by
descriptions in language, and by the accompanying decomposition
of their parts into simple and more familiar elements. In abstract
conceptual thought language is of course indispensable.
Thinking without words is at least partly realised in every in-
stance where a newly invented concept appears as the result of
thinking, that is wherever there is new scientific development.
The importance of language for conceptual thought is best
observed by an examination of the formation of words and symbols
that have been reached in full consciousness during the course of
the development of science.
The concept of "exponent" originated in Descartes's having
written a multiplied by itself ;/ times, a" ; at any rate, the concept
received for the first time by this act of Descartes an independent
standing, and was made capable of further development. Here
was really given for the first time the starting-point from which the
concepts of negative and fractional exponents and of continuously
varying refractive indices and of logarithms were reached. The en-
tire body of algebraic symbols, which is a product of conscious and
designed invention throughout, is instructive in other respects also.
We learn to operate mechanically with this system without having
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constantly present before our minds the full significance of the
operations involved. In like manner words also are joined asso-
ciatively with one another without our possessing in consciousness
all the precise images that correspond to them. Like algebra, lan-
guage involves a temporary disburdenment of thought. In the
measure in which our scientific terminology is carried nearer to
Liebnitz's ideal of a Universal Character, which is a process actually
taking place, the high advantages of such a system will be vividly
felt.i
1 Compare Science ofMechanics, Chicago, 1893, p. 482.
